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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final order of judgment 
entered in the Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Scott Daniels, Judge presiding. 
PARTIES AND DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The original parties to this action are the aforemen-
tioned parties, as well as two named Defendants, to wit: Frank 
Klaas and John Doe. Jurisdiction over the John Doe was not 
obtained and action against Defendant Klaas was dismissed by 
stipulation of the remaining parties. 
On November 26, 1985, a partial summary judgment motion 
and a non-jury trial were heard before the Honorable Scott 
Daniels, judge presiding, and a subsequent order on the motion 
and findings, conclusions and order were entered on March 26, 
1986. The Plaintiff filed Notice of Appeal on April 23, 1986, 
which was amended and re-filed on May 5, 1986. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order of this Court for additur to 
the amount of general and punitive damages awarded to Plaintiff. 
Alternatively, Plaintiff requests the matter be remanded to the 
court below for further findings on the issue of damages only. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether trial court erred in denying Plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of liability. 
2. Whether trial court erred in reducing or denying 
Plaintiff's award for general and punitive damages, 
3. Whether Plaintiff is entitled to additur of his 
damage award, or alternatively, further findings on the issue of 
damages. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff originally complained for compensatory and 
punitive relief from the tortious conduct of Defendant Cau]field. 
(R. at 2-7, addendum A.) Following service of process and 
discovery, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
issue of liability, based in part upon Caulfield's intervening 
criminal conviction for the same conduct. (R. at 125-134.) 
The matter came before the court for hearing on the 
motion and non-jury trial, which was set before Judge J. Dennis 
Frederick, but heard on November 26, 1985 by Judge Scott Daniels. 
The court heard the motion, which was denied, and proceeded to 
trial on all issues. (R. at 143-144.) 
The court subsequently entered an order which held that 
"the court was substantially persuaded by the facts and the law 
supporting Plaintiff's motion" but did not grant the motion. (R. 
at 146-147, addendum B.) 
During the trial, the Plaintiff again offered documen-
tary evidence of Defendant's criminal conviction to establish 
civil liability. (R. at 145, Exhibit 26-P, addendum D.) 
Therein was contained indication of the sentence imposed by the 
deciding court, including a $1,000.00 fine. 
Following trial the court ordered judgment for the 
Plaintiff. However, in its findings and conclusions the court 
reduced Plaintiff's general damage award on the basis that 
Plaintiff's emotional distress was mitigated by his years of 
experience as a police officer and private detective and that 
Plaintiff assumed that risk. (R. at 151, Findings of Fact, 
paragraph 17, addendum C.) Further, the court found that 
Plaintiff was entitled to punitive damages, but awarded $0.00 
based solely upon the fact that Defendant had been required to 
pay a fine in the criminal case of $1,000.00. (R. at 152, 
Findings of Fact, paragraphs 24, 27-29, addendum C.) The court's 
Conclusions of Law reflected such findings and judgment for 
Plaintiff was entered. (R. at 153-156, addendum C.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in not granting Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of liability. Further, 
the trial court erred in its assessment and allocation of general 
and punitive damages based on improper application of the princi-
ple of assumption of risk and improper allocation of punitive 
damages. 
__o 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING TO DENY 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY 
The application of summary judgment is designed for the 
purpose of avoiding unnecessary trials on matters where no 
genuine issues of fact exist. Reagan Outdoor Advertising v. 
Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776 (1984). In the instant case, the trial 
judge ruled that he was "substantially persuaded" by Plaintiff's 
motion, but proceeded to trial simply because both parties were 
present and ready to proceed. 
The Appellant herein contends that such ruling was 
inconsistent, and resulted in error which prejudiced subsequent 
determination of damages. Where there are no facts created which 
would give rise to a material issue, summary judgment relief is 
appropriate. Anderson v. American Savings and Loan, 668 P.2 1253 
(1983); Barnes v. Sohio Natural Resources Company, 627 P.2d 56 
(1981) . 
The prejudicial error which resulted from the inconsis-
tent ruling of the trial judge can be related to the relitigation 
of the issue. During the trial, Plaintiff submitted documenta-
tion of Defendant Caulfield's criminal conviction for the purpose 
of establishing liability. (Addendum D.) Contained in the 
document was a recitation of the sentence imposed, including a 
fine of $1,000.00. Had summary judgment been properly granted, 
such evidence would not have been submitted or subsequently 
considered by the court in determining punitive damages. 
Based on the court's own ruling, the failure to grant 
summary judgment was error and as such should be remanded to the 
trial court for an order consistent with its findings. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS 
ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES 
The trial court found for Plaintiff and awarded both 
general and punitive damages. However, the general damages were 
erroneously mitigated by Plaintiff's "assumption of risk". 
Likewise, the punitive damage award was wrongly nullified by the 
court's gratuitous recognition of the $1,000.00 fine paid in a 
related criminal case. 
A. General Damages 
The doctrine of assumption of risk is commonly seen in 
three general areas of tort law: negligence, master-servant, and 
strict liability. See generally, 7 C.J.S. Assumption of Risk; 
65A C.J.S. §174 Negligence. Somewhat mystically, the doctrine 
arose in the instant matter in the court's finding (paragraph 17) 
that Plaintiff's prior and present profession inferred a reason-
able expectation of endangerment which Plaintiff was found to 
have assumed. 
Whether a person can reasonably expect to be shot at 
while picking up abandoned garbage sacks may be a factual issue 
left to the determination of the trial court. However, there is 
two bases for Appellant's contention that the trial court erred 
in its application. 
S-
Initially, the torts of assault and infliction of 
emotional distress as pled in the instant case are intentional 
torts. It is Appellant's position that one cannot assume the 
risk of an intentional tort. 
Secondly, Plaintiff's job as a private investigator is 
not so inherently dangerous as to give rise to reasonable expec-
tation of extreme violence. To that end, it is argued that in 
order for defense of assumption of risk to be established, it 
should be found that Plaintiff voluntarily and unreasonably 
encountered a known risk. 
The analysis of a sister jurisdiction is borrowed in 
support of this contention. In Johnson v. Clark Equipment 
Company, 547 P.2d 132 (Oregon, 1976), a product liability action 
was brought against manufacturers and sellers of a forklift. The 
court therein analyzed the aspects of assumption of risk from a 
product liability standpoint. It further noted some consid-
erations salient to the reasonableness of encountering 
job-related danger. 
Reviewing caselaw of other jurisdictions, the Johnson 
court observed: 
"It could never be said as a matter of law 
that a workman whose job requires him to 
expose himself to danger voluntarily and 
unreasonably encounters the same." [Citation 
omitted.] 
The court went on to note: 
"Plaintiff must be declared free of contribu-
tory negligence as a matter of law because 
the risk of harm itself was not so imminent, 
nor was the likelihood of injury so great 
that, in view of the interest plaintiff 
sought to advance, no prudent man would 
face it". [Citation omitted.] 
547 P.2d at 141. 
In the instant matter, the court made no finding that 
the risk was known, nor did it indicate the subjecting to such 
risk was done voluntarily or unreasonably. The court only stated 
that Plaintiff should reasonably expect to be so endangered in 
his employment, and reduced the general damage as a result. 
It is herein asserted that the doctrine of assumption 
of risk was inappropriately applied and this matter should be 
remanded to the trial court for assessment of general damages 
consistent with its findings. 
B. Punitive Damages 
The most curious part of the decision in the instant 
matter was the court's ruling on punitive damages. The court 
made the necessary findings for an award of punitive damages, and 
then awarded Plaintiff $0.00. In so doing, the court considered 
evidence improperly before the court and resultantly ruled in a 
manner which is at variance with the claims of both parties. See 
Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733 (1984); 
West v. West, 16 Utah 2d 411, 403 P.2d 22 (1965). 
Utah has traditionally permitted recovery of punitive 
damages in personal injury cases, including assault. Cruz v. 
Montoya, 660 P.2d 723 (1983). However, such award must be 
intended as a deterrent and preventative measure to prospectively 
restrain the malefactor, and should be granted infrequently. 
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (1983). 
Again, the Appellant would assert two bases for remand-
ing this matter back to the trial court on the issue of punitive 
damages. First, the award of $0.00 damage is contrary to the 
court's finding and results in an inconsistent judgment. While 
granting Plaintiff relief, the absence of an award results in a 
ruling in favor of Defendant. 
Secondly/ the court indicated it considered the 
$1,000.00 fine a sufficient punishment of Defendant. This was 
discerned from evidence before the court submitted to establish 
liability. While this Court grants broad discretion to the trial 
court in determining damages, the award may be set aside if the 
trial court neglected certain pertinent elements or was unduly 
influenced by extraneous circumstances. Mabey v. Kay Peterson 
Construction Co., 682 P.2d 287 (1984); Clayton v. Crossroads 
Equipment Co., 655 P.2d 1125 (1982). 
The court, bv its ruling, improperly considered the 
extraneous circumstance of Defendant's sentence in the criminal 
matter. This was particularly true where the general damage 
award had already been reduced. Therefore, the matter should be 
remanded to the trial court for award consistent with the find-
ings of the court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the general and punitive 
damage awards totalling $500.00 should be ruled inadequate and 
the matter remanded to the trial court for further findings on 
the issue of damages. 
DATED this IQ day of December, 19|86. 
LONI F. qeLAND 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
SCOTT W. TjfEEI 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the X day of December, 
1986, four true and correct copies of the foregoing were mailed, 
with postage prepaid fully thereon, to David K. Smith, Attorney 
for Defendant/Respondent, 6925 Union Park Center^ #30$, Midvale, 
Utah 84047. 
ADDENDUM 
A. COMPLAINT 
B. ORDER ON MOTION 
C. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
D. EXHIBIT P-26 
'FHEO Ml CtEPKS OFFICE 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STfrKE OF UTAH 
DAVID WESTLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
-v-
EDWARD CAULFIELD, FRANK 
KLAAS, and JOHN DOE, 
Defendants. 
Civil Number: :
 C84585S 
Plaintiff alleges, and complains, for causes of action, as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendants Caufield and Klaas are residents of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
3. The identity and residence of Defendant Doe is unknown to Plain-
tiff. 
4. On or about the 19th day of April, 1984, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, Defendant Caulfield intentionally fired a .38 caliber 
revolver at Plaintiff, as Plaintiff was seated in his automobile. 
5. Said firing of said revolver was without justification. 
6. Said firing of said revolver was in violation of certain penal 
statutes of the State of Utah, designed to protect a class of which 
Plaintiff is a member. 
7. The projectile discharged, as complained of above, struck 
Plaintiff's motor vehirlp. ranc^o ^ m a . n -i -~ , « * :. «i-.1 *a-« 
8. Said damage to Plaintiff's motor vehicle was intentionally 
caused by Defendant Caulfield. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
9. Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 
1-8 aboves and reincorporates them herein by reference. 
10. The circumstances of Defendant Caulfieldfs firing of the re-
volver as complained of above were such as to create in the mind of 
Plaintiff a well-founded fear of imminent battery. 
11. The acts of Defendant Caufield complained of above were such 
that Defendant Caufield had the apparent ability to effectuate a battery 
on Plaintiff. 
12. The acts of Defendant Caulfield as complained of above were 
intended by him to put Plaintiff in reasonable apprehension of an immed-
iate battery, or were done with knowledge to a substantial certainty that 
Plaintiff would be put in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery, 
or were done with knowledge to a substantial certainty that Plaintiff 
would be put in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery. 
13. The acts of Defendant as complained of above caused Plain-
tiff great mental distress, pain and anguish, and damages. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
14. Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 
1-13, above, and reincorporates them herein by reference. 
15. The projectile discharged by Defendant Caulfield, as des-
cribed above, were done with the intent and desire to cause Plaintiff 
great emotional distress, or with knowledge to a substantial certainty 
that great emotional distress to Plaintiff would result. 
16. The acts of Defendant Caulfield, as complained of above, were 
done with the intent and desire to cause Plaintiff great emotional distress, 
or with knowledge to a substantial certainty that great emotional distress 
to Plaintiff would result. 
17. Said acts of Defendant caused Plaintiff great mental distress, 
pain and anguish, and damages. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
18. Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 
1 — 17^ and reincorporates them herein by reference. 
19. The revolver which Defendant Caulfield committed the acts 
complained of above was provided to Defendant Caulfield by Defendant 
John Doe. 
20. Defendant John Doe was under a duty to exercise reasonable 
care in providing a revolver to another individual. 
21. Defendant John Doe breached said duty of reasonable care in 
providing Defendant Caulfield a revolver as complained of above. 
22. The acts of Defendant John Doe as complained of above were 
without any utility, and were with substantial risks to members of the 
public. 
23. Defendant John Doe's conduct, as complained of above, consti-
tuted an unreasonable risk of harm to others , including members of the 
general public, and Plaintiff. 
24. As a proximate result of Defendant John Doe's breach of his 
duty of reasonable care, Plaintiff has suffered damages. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
25. Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 
1-24, above, and reincorporates then herein by reference. 
26. The confrontation of Defendant Caulfield with Plaintiff, as 
complained of above, was done at the request, and with the assent, agree-
ment, approval and knowledge and for the benefit, and at the suggestion 
of Defendant Klaas. 
27. Minutes before Defendant Caulfield fired the revolver, as com-
plained of above, he and Defendant Klaas planned to confront Plaintiff. 
28. The planned confrontation occurred, and at said confrontation 
the acts of Defendant Caulfield, as complained of above, occurred. 
29. During Defendants' Caulfield and Klaas1 planning,, as com-
plained of above, Defendant Caulfield produced the revolver complained 
of above, and loaded the same, in preparation for the above-stated confron-
tation with Plaintiff, all in the presence of Defendant Klaas. 
30. During said planning, Defendant Klaas took no steps to dissuade 
or deter Defendant Caulfield from loading, carrying, or using said re-
volver as complained above. 
31. Defendant Caulfield was acting as Defendant Klaas1 agent 
in doing the acts complained of above. 
32. Plaintiff has suffered damages as a result of the acts, comp-
lained of above, done by Defendant Klaas* agent. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
33. Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 
1-32, above, and reincorporates them herein by reference. 
34. Defendant Klaas, by his actions and words, set into motion 
the acts of Defendant Caulfield complained of above, and the conseq-
uences of those acts, as complained of above. 
35. Defendant Klaas owed a duty to the members of the general 
public, including Plaintiff, to exercise reasonable care in taking 
the steps which he did, as complained of above. 
36. The acts and activity of Defendant Klaas, as complained of 
above, were without any utility, and were with, and constituted, a 
substantial risk to members of the general public. 
37. The acts and activity of Defendant Klaas, as complained of 
above, constitiuted an unreasonable risk of harm to the members of the 
general public, including Plaintiff. 
38. Defendant Klaas breached the duty of reasonable care owed 
to the general public,including Plaintiff, as alleged above. 
39. Defendant Klaas1 breach of said duty proximately caused Plain-
tiff damages. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgement as follows: 
1. On the FIRST and FIFTH CAUSES OF ACTION, $6,000 in compensatory 
damages, and punitive damages in the sum of $50,000. 
2. On the SECOND, THIRD, and FIFTH CAUSES OF ACTION, compensatory 
damages in a sum to be determined and proved at trial, but not less than 
$50,000, and punitive damages in the sum of $50,000. 
3. On the FOURTH and SIXTH CAUSES OF ACTION, compensatory damages 
in a sum to be determined and proved at the time of trial, but not less 
than the sum of $56,000. 
-5-
DATED THIS 3. day of October, 1984. 
Jybhn W. Ebert 
ttorney for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's address: 
1288 Sunset Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
FILMED 
LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
McRae & DeLand 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID WESTLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDWARD CAULFIELD, FRANK KLAAS, 
and JOHN DOE, 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C-84-5856 
Judge Daniels 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as to defendant 
Caulfield's liability only on plaintiff's Complaint came before 
the Honorable Scott Daniels at 9:00 a.m. on November 26, 1985. 
Plaintiff was present and represented by Loni F. 
DeLand. Defendant Caulfield was present and represented by David 
K. Smith. 
The court reviewed the Memorandum of plaintiff and 
heard the argument of both counsel, defendant Caulfield having 
filed no responsive memorandum thereto. 
After hearing the proffer and argument of counsel and 
reviewing plaintiff's Memorandum and the pleadings and file 
herein, even though the court was substantially persuaded by the 
facts and the law supporting plaintiff's motion, the court 
_ v *< is * 
observed that both parties were present and ready to proceed to 
trial and does therefor; 
HEREBY ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE that plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be and is denied. 
DATED this <PS, day of kklL^L , 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
SCOTT DANIELS 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: I k T T S ^ T 
»y 
DAVID K. SMITH 
Attorney for Defendant 
D»AON m.«iiA2T 
EN^.*/C*f* 
LONI F. DeLAND 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
/ 
L 
f / 
nLr-: 
LONI F. DeLAND (0862) 
McRae & DeLand 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
132 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 364-1333 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID WESTLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDWARD CAULFIELD, FRANK KLAAS, 
and JOHN DOE, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, JUDGMENT AND ORDER ON 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AND 
DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No. C-84-5856 
Judge Daniels 
The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the 
Honorable Scott Daniels, sitting without a jury, at 9:00 a.m., 
November 26, 1985, on Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendant 
Edward Caulfield and said Defendant's Counterclaim, the remaining 
Defendants having been previously dismissed as parties hereto. 
Plaintiff was present and represented by Loni F. 
DeLand. Defendant Caulfield was present and represented by David 
K. Smith. 
Each party testified and called witnesses on their 
behalf. The Court heard the testimony of the parties and the 
witnesses and received the exhibits offered by each party. 
Nowf having heard the evidence and testimony, reviewed 
the exhibits, pleadings, and file herein, the Court enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about 8:20 a.m., April 19, 1984, plaintiff, 
acting in the scope of his employment as a duly licensed private 
investigator, was engaged in collecting the garbage of Frank 
Klaas which had been deposited on the curb in front of Klaas1 
residence in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
2. At said time, date and location, defendant Edward 
Caulfield intentionally fired a .38 caliber revolver at plain-
tiff's vehicle as plaintiff was attempting to drive away from the 
scene. 
3. The projectile struck the molding of the rear 
window of plaintiff's vehicle shattering the said window and 
causing damage to the body and paint on the rear of the vehicle. 
4. The reasonable and necessary cost of repairs to 
said vehicle were $105.75 to replace the window and $350. for 
painting and body repairs. 
5. The said damages and required repairs were 
proximately caused by defendant. 
6. Plaintiff was without the use of said vehicle for 
approximately four days while repairs were done. 
7. The reasonable value of the loss of use of said 
vehicle is $100. 
8. The defendant should be liable to plaintiff in the 
sum of $555,75, special damages, to compensate plaintiff for the 
cost of repairs to and loss of use of said vehicle. 
9. In fleeing the scene of the shooting, plaintiff's 
vehicle did not touch defendant Caulfield. 
10. Plaintiff did not assault or intend to assault 
defendant with said vehicle. 
11. Plaintiff's acceleration and flight from the scene 
was a reasonable response to the actions of defendant Caulfield. 
12. There being no assault by plaintiff as claimed by 
defendant Caulfield, said defendant's Counterclaim should be 
dismissed for no cause of action. 
13. Plaintiff reasonably believed that the projectile 
fired by defendant at plaintiff's vehicle could have easily 
struck him in the back of his head thereby causing death or 
serious bodily injury. 
14. Due to the defendant's use of the firearm and the 
testimony of plaintiff's expert witness, Ed Barton, plaintiff's 
subjective belief as alleged above is a reasonable one. 
15. As a natural consequence of the actions of defen-
dant Caulfield and plaintiff's reasonable belief, plaintiff 
suffered emotional distress infrequently for a period of a few 
months following the shooting. 
. $ \** 
16. Defendant Caulfield knew or should have known that 
firing his weapon at plaintiff's vehicle while plaintiff was 
inside it would inflict emotional distress upon plaintiff. 
17. However, plaintiff has many years of experience as 
a police officer and a private investigator including prior 
shooting incidents which should mitigate the distress suffered by 
plaintiff since he has, by virtue of his chosen profession(s), 
assumed the risk of being shot at and should reasonable expect to 
be so endangered in his employment. 
18. Defendant Caulfield should be ordered to pay 
plaintiff the sum of $500. general damages to compensate him for 
the emotional distress inflicted by said defendant on plaintiff 
as a natural consequence of defendant's conduct. 
19. Plaintiff was not licensed, on April 19, 1984, by 
Salt Lake County or Sandy City, as a person authorized under 
those respective ordinances to engage in garbage collection. 
20. Defendant Caulfield's conduct in firing a deadly 
weapon at plaintiff's vehicle while plaintiff was driving the 
said vehicle is an aggravated assault regardless of whether or 
not defendant's intent was to "only" mark the vehicle. 
21. Defendant Caulfield's conduct as described above 
was willful and malicious. 
22. Defendant Caulfield's actions are not mitigated, 
excused or justified by the facts, the law or any defense raised 
by defendant herein. 
23. Defendant Caulfield's actions were extremely 
reckless and ran the risk of causing plaintiff death or serious 
bodily injury. 
24. Defendant Caulfield's actions should be punished 
and said punishment should be substantial enough to deter him 
from similar conduct in the future. 
25. Defendant Caulfield owns an equity in his home of 
$7,200 to $9,200, vehicles worth $7,000, stocks valued at $700 
and bank accounts totaling $5,000. 
26. Defendant Caulfield is presently unemployed and 
unable to be employed in his chosen profession as a commercial 
helicopter pilot due to his inability to obtain FAA licensing for 
medical reasons, however, he is able bodied and capable of other 
employment but chooses not to seek or accept other employment. 
27 • However, defendant Caulfield was prosecuted 
criminally for these same actions and pleaded guilty to a reduced 
charge for which he was placed on probation and fined $1,000.00, 
the fine having been paid by him and the term of probation having 
been successfully completed without violation. 
28. The $1,000 fine exacted by the criminal court is 
sufficient to punish defendant and deter him from future similar 
conduct. 
29. Punitive damages in the instant lawsuit should be 
awarded plaintiff in the sum of $0. 
30. Defendant Caulfield's responses to plaintiff's 
Request for Admissions, dated December 14, 1985, were apposite 
his deposition testimony, court testimony herein and his plea of 
guilty in the related criminal case, which responses required 
unnecessary time and effort by plaintiff's counsel in preparing 
for trial, 
31. Plaintiff, therefor, should be awarded $250 
attorney's fees. 
32. Plaintiff should be awarded all costs incurred 
herein which are taxable and were reasonable and necessary in 
prosecuting his Complaint and defending defendant's Counterclaim. 
33. Plaintiff should be awarded pre-judgment interest 
on his special, general and punitive damages from and after April 
19, 1984, and until entry of the judgment herein. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the court now makes 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff's allegations of aggravated assault, 
battery and infliction of emotional distress are proved against 
defendant Caulfield by a preponderance of the evidence. 
2. Defendant Caulfield did not preponderate on any 
claim in his Counterclaim. 
3. Defendant Caulfield's Counterclaim should be 
dismissed for no cause of action. 
4. Defendant Caulfield's defenses to plaintiff's 
Complaint are without factual or legal merit. 
5. Defendant Caulfield's unjustified, inexcusable and 
unreasonable use of a deadly weapon created a serious risk of 
death or bodily injury to plaintiff. 
6. The said actions of defendant Caulfield were 
intentional, willful and malicious. 
7. Defendant Caulfield's actions proximately caused 
plaintiff to incur special damages in the sum of $555.75, for 
repairs to and loss of use of his vehicle, for which said defen-
dant should be liable to plaintiff. 
8. Plaintiff suffered emotional distress as a natural 
consequence of defendant Caulfield's actionable conduct for which 
plaintiff should be awarded $500 general damages against said 
defendant. 
9. Defendant Caulfield's aggravated tortious conduct 
should be punished and he should be prospectively deterred from 
such conduct by an award of punitive damages to plaintiff. 
10. The $1,000 fine exacted against defendant 
Caulfield in the related criminal case is sufficient and just 
punishment for his conduct. 
11. Punitive damages should be awarded to plaintiff, 
and against defendant Caulfield in the sum of $0. 
12. Attorney's fees of $250 should be awarded plain-
tiff, and against defendant Caulfield, due to said defendant's 
failure to provide genuine and accurate answers to plaintiff's 
Request for Admissions on file herein under date of December 14, 
1985. 
13. Defendant Caulfield should be ordered to pay 
plaintiff his reasonable and necessary costs incurred in pros-
ecuting plaintiff's Complaint and defending defendant's Counter-
claim. 
14. Defendant Caulfield should be ordered to pay 
plaintiff interest at the statutory pre-judgment rate retrospec-
tive to April 19, 1984. 
15. Plaintiff should be awarded a judgment against 
defendant Caulfield in the sum of $1,555.75 for special, general 
and punitive damages; interest thereon at the statutory rate 
retrospective to April 19, 1984; attorney's fees in the sum of 
$250 and reasonable costs. 
16. Interest from April 19, 1984 on $1,555.75, to and 
including December 19, 1985 equals $155.59. 
JUDGMENT 
1. Plaintiff is awarded a judgment against defendant 
Caulfield in the sum of $1,961.34, on plaintiff's Complaint, 
Counts I, II and III. 
2. The said judgment includes special, general and 
punitive damages, prejudgment interest thereon to December 19, 
1985, attorney's fees and taxable costs. 
. • * ' 
.*•*?$>> 
3. Defendant Caulfield's Counterclaim herein is 
dismissed. 
DATED this J.^ day of \LJAMA, , 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
SCOTT DANIELS 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DAVID K. SMITH 
Attorney for Defendant 
) 7* 
LONI F. DeLAND 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
\? 
Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department. 
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